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THERE’S SOMETHING IN THE WATER: THE EHB
DISREGARDS ITS MANDATE AND DISRESPECTS CONTRACT
LAW IN ROBINSON COAL COMPANY V. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The first record of Pennsylvania coal production dates back to
1761, in what is now downtown Pittsburgh.1 The coal mining industry grew slowly at first and sustained a production surge following
the Civil War and the Industrial Revolution.2 Further, in 1918, the
Pennsylvania coal industry experienced its most productive year in
response to World War I, when hundreds of thousands of miners
produced 227 million tons of coal.3 Today, Pennsylvania is the
fourth highest coal-producing state, accounting for approximately
sixty thousand tons of coal mined per year.4 Despite a long history
of coal mining, geologists currently estimate Pennsylvania contains
a staggering seventy-six billion tons of coal.5 A majority of this coal
will remain underground indefinitely, due to the extreme difficulty
and high costs associated with recovering it.6
While there are numerous methods miners employ to recover
coal, underground and strip surface mining are among the most
efficient.7 Historically, underground mining involved driving a tunnel “along a coal bed[,] either” on the surface “where the coal is
exposed[,]” or from an excavated shaft from the surface.8 Miners
would then excavate additional tunnels, utilizing the “room-and-pillar” method.9 This process consists of mining sizable underground
1. See William E. Edmunds, Coal in Pennsylvania, PA. GEOLOGICAL SURV., 2
(2002), available at http://www.dcnr.state.pa.us/cs/groups/public/documents/
document/dcnr_014594.pdf (noting first record of coal mining in Pennsylvania).
2. See id. (discussing coal mining early development and growth).
3. See id. (explaining coal mining expansion in Pennsylvania’s coal industry).
4. See U.S. Coal Production by State & by Rank, NAT’L MINING ASS’N, http://www
.nma.org/pdf/c_production_state_rank.pdf (last updated Feb. 2016) (reporting
top coal-producing states by amount produced in 2014). In 2014, the most recent
year for which data is available, Pennsylvania mined sixty thousand tons of coal, or
6.2 percent of the total mined in the United States. Id.
5. See Edmunds, supra note 1, at 17 (discussing amount of coal left
underground).
6. See id. (discussing difficulty of retrieving leftover coal).
7. See id. at 16-17 (detailing common mining methods).
8. Id. at 16 (providing historical mining methodology).
9. See id. (highlighting room-and-pillar mining process).
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rooms where workers leave “pillars” of coal to support the rocky
ceiling above.10 Surface mining, on the other hand, requires the
excavation of a large amount of land and the removal of the coal
contained underground.11 Surface mining is commonly referred to
as opencast or open-pit mining.12
After mining operations cease, coal mines often leave behind a
metal-rich water runoff aptly named acid mine discharge.13 This
discharge is created when sulphuric rocks react with air and water
to form discharge rich in sulphuric acid and iron.14 This toxic
waste threatens the environment and requires treatment in order to
prevent potentially significant environmental damage.15
Pennsylvania’s Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) recently
highlighted the importance of coal companies and environmental
regulators working together in Robinson Coal Company v. Department
of Environmental Protection,16 by rewriting the terms of their agreement.17 In taking this action, the EHB found that the Pennsylvania
Department of Environmental Protection (Department) abused its
discretion when it failed to provide Robinson Coal Company
(Robinson) with a realistic endpoint for treating the acid mine discharge.18 In the court’s analysis, however, the EHB wrongly expanded its mandated power and acted more like a court in equity.19
Part II of this Note provides the factual history of the Robinson
Coal case.20 Part III addresses the statutory and judicial background
fundamental to the EHB’s power to decide appeals regarding the
10. See Edmunds, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining room-and-pillar mining
method).
11. See Coal Mining, WORLD COAL ASS’N, https://www.worldcoal.org/coal/
coal-mining (last visited Dec. 28, 2015) (describing surface coal mining method).
12. See id. (referring to surface coal mining as opencast and open-pit mining).
13. See Coal Mining & the Environment, WORLD COAL ASS’N, http://www
.worldcoal.org/environmental-protection/coal-mining-environment (last visited
Feb. 18, 2016) (highlighting environmental threats posed by acid mine drainage).
14. See Coal Mining & Water, WORLD COAL ASS’N, http://www.worldcoal.org/
environmental-protection/coal-water (last visited Feb. 18, 2016) (describing how
acid mine drainage is created).
15. See id. (noting negative impact of acid mine drainage on environment).
16. No. 2010-186-M, 2015 WL 1501150 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Mar. 16,
2015).
17. For an explanation of how the case proceeded factually, see infra notes 2559 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of the EHB’s reasoning, see infra notes 113-150
and accompanying text.
19. For a critical analysis of how the EHB acted outside of its power, see infra
notes 151-181 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the factual background of Robinson Coal, see
infra notes 25-59 and accompanying text.
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Department’s actions.21 Part IV examines the Robinson Coal court’s
decision and describes its rationale.22 Next, Part V makes a critical
analysis of the EHB’s ruling on an order not on appeal, and its
subsequent disregard of established contract law.23 Finally, Part VI
of this Note addresses the potential impact of the EHB’s unprecedented decision on coal companies in Pennsylvania.24
II. FACTS
A. Activities in the 1980s and 1990s
Robinson Coal Company owned and operated the Putt Mine, a
surface coal mine located in Robinson Township, Washington
County, Pennsylvania.25 Robinson submitted a mining permit in
1984 in order to begin mining operations and completed site reclamation in 1991.26 Reclamation is the process mining companies
must complete once operations cease.27 The purpose of reclamation is to restore the above-ground ecosystem as it was before mining began.28
To ensure reclamation occurs, federal law requires coal companies to purchase a bond to guarantee they will have the finances
to later reclaim their mining site.29 Pennsylvania, however, allows
coal companies to fund a treatment trust as an alternative to
purchasing a bond, in order to provide treatment funds long into
21. For a further discussion of the legal background of surface coal mining
regulation, see infra notes 60-112 and accompanying text.
22. For a narrative analysis of the EHB’s decision and dissent, see infra notes
113-150 and accompanying text.
23. For a critical discussion of the EHB’s improper expansion of power, see
infra notes 151-181 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the future impact of Robinson Coal, see infra notes 182194 and accompanying text.
25. See Robinson Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-186-M, 2015 WL
1501150, at *3 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Mar. 16, 2015) (noting parties to action).
The Putt Mine is located approximately fourteen miles southwest of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. Id.
26. See id. (discussing Robinson’s activities leading up to dispute). The Department quickly issued the permit, and mining began at the site in 1985. Id.
“Mining was completed in 1989,” at which point Robinson began the reclamation
process. Id.
27. See Reclamation, NAT’L MINING ASS’N, http://www.miningfacts.org/environment/what-happens-to-mine-sites-after-a-mine-is-closed/ (last visited Feb. 25,
2016) (detailing reclamation process).
28. See id. (explaining purposes of mine reclamation).
29. See Treatment Trust Funds, PA. DEPARTMENT OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, http://
www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Land/Mining/BureauofDistrictMining/TreatmentTrustFund/Pages/default.aspx#.VqkJKFMrJXg (last visited Jan. 27, 2016) (explaining treatment bonds and treatment trusts generally required prior to beginning
mining operations).
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the future.30 After denying Robinson’s bond release request, the
Department released the bond in 2003 after the parties negotiated
and executed a post-mining treatment trust agreement.31
The 1984 Permit allowed Robinson to mine coal from the Putt
Mine and to “daylight” antique underground mines on the site.32
“Daylighting” refers to a form of remining, which occurs when coal
companies create a surface mine on top of an old underground
coal mine to remove leftover coal columns.33 Daylighting’s impact
on water discharge quality yields mixed results in Pennsylvania;
“remining” activities, however, have substantially reduced acidic
mine discharge in Washington County.34
B. Testing the Waters
In response to Robinson’s request to release the reclamation
bond in 1993, the Department sent a hydrogeologist to conduct a
hydrologic investigation at SP-1, a monitoring point at Putt Mine.35
The hydrogeologist concluded the mine’s discharge converted
from “alkaline to acidic[,] with higher concentrations of iron, manganese and sulfates.”36
Less than one year later, in 1994, the Department issued an
order directing Robinson to begin provisional treatment of the SP-1
discharge and to submit plans for permanent treatment at the same
30. See id. (defining post-mining treatment trusts permitted in Pennsylvania as
alternative treatment security).
31. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *3 (discussing existence of postmining treatment trust). Post-mining treatment trusts are used throughout the
coal mining industry as a means to ensure the mining discharge will be treated,
regardless of the operator’s future solvency. Id. For an explanation of the 2002
CO&A, see infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
32. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *3 (noting Robinson’s activities at
Putt Mine).
33. See Jay W. Hawkins, Remining Coal, LEHIGH ENVTL. INQUIRY, http://www
.ei.lehigh.edu/envirosci/enviroissue/amd/links/remining.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2015) (providing in-depth discussion regarding remining and daylighting).
This is an efficient process because oftentimes, old underground mines leave behind large amounts of coal due to technological limitations. Id. In Washington
County specifically, the court noted old underground mines generally left about
twenty to thirty percent of the coal. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *3.
34. See Hawkins, supra note 33 (discussing daylighting benefits to water discharge quality). Remining activities in other counties in Pennsylvania, including
Greene and Tioga Counties, generally increase discharge acidity. Id.
35. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *4 (discussing hydrologic investigation initiated by reclamation bond’s release request).
36. See id. (detailing findings of hydrogeologist’s report). Additionally, the
hydrogeologist recommended Robinson acquire a permit to daylight an adjacent
mine. Id. In 1998, Robinson daylighted an adjacent mine. Id.
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location.37 Robinson appealed the order to the EHB and the parties subsequently settled and executed the 1994 Consent Order and
Agreement (1994 CO&A).38 Per the 1994 CO&A, Robinson agreed
to upgrade the existing treatment system, evaluate other treatment
plans, submit a permanent treatment plan, and install a permanent
treatment system at SP-1.39
Robinson’s new treatment system consisted of two parts: 1) an
anoxic (oxygen deprived) limestone drain (ALD) and 2) a settling
basin.40 An ALD is a system of limestone trenches with flowing anoxic water to reduce the water discharge’s acidity.41 A settling basin
is then used to slow the water discharge rate so gravity can remove
remaining iron and other toxic substances from the water.42 The
system provided for the polluted water to flow “out of the ALD
through an outlet pipe and then [ ] into the settling basin.”43 From
the settling basin, the acid mine discharge ran past the permit
boundary and into the North Branch of Robinson Run, a nearby
stream.44
In November 2002, Robinson and the Department entered
into the Treatment Trust Consent Order and Agreement (2002
CO&A).45 This agreement required Robinson to adhere to certain
statutory water discharge standards and to maintain the treatment
system forever, “or until water treatment is no longer necessary.”46
37. See id. (discussing 1994 Order). In response to the 1994 Order, Robinson
promptly installed a temporary water treatment system at SP-1. Id.
38. See id. at *5 (discussing Robinson’s appeal of 1994 Order).
39. See id. (highlighting details of 1994 CO&A entered into between parties).
40. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *5 (discussing Robinson’s treatment system). ALD treatment systems similar to the one used here are some of the
cheapest and least chemically intensive means of treating acidic mine discharge.
Id.
41. See Jeff Skousen, Overview of Passive Systems for Treating Acid Mine Drainage,
WEST BRANCH SUSQUEHANNA RESTORATION COALITION, http://www.wbsrc.org/
uploads/2/5/6/0/25607137/97_passive_trt_overview.pdf (last visited Feb. 18,
2016) (describing ALD systems and how they function). The main advantage of an
ALD system is that it is effective and does not require the use of chemicals. Id.
42. See Reference Guide to Treatment Technologies for Mining-Influenced Water, EPA
85, (March 2014), available at https://clu-in.org/download/issues/mining/Reference_Guide_to_Treatment_Technologies_for_MIW.pdf [hereinafter Reference
Guide to Treatment Technologies] (describing purpose of settling basin).
43. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *5 (explaining passive treatment system’s design).
44. See id. at *6 (describing system’s final discharge location).
45. See id. (noting existence of 2002 Trust CO&A).
46. See id. (detailing specific requirements of 2002 CO&A). The agreement
made no mention of how to determine when discharge treatment “is no longer
necessary.” Id. at *7. Additionally, the agreement required the Department to
schedule annual meetings; the Department failed to do this until 2010, only at
Robinson’s bequest. Id.
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As part of the agreement, the Department released $200,969 in reclamation bonds to Robinson, upon Robinson’s $25,893 funding of
a reclamation treatment trust.47 Additionally, the parties agreed
that the permit boundary, located after the ALD and the settling
basin, would be the compliance sampling point.48
C. The Department’s 2010 Order
After substantial remedial activity, the Department subjected
Robinson to tests in order to determine compliance with Pennsylvania’s environmental protection statute.49 On October 13,
2010, the Department’s Mining Conservation Inspector, Jeffrey
Kohut, collected a sample from the settling basin’s outlet.50 The
proper compliance point, however, was the “permit boundary,” as
dictated by the 2002 CO&A.51 Mr. Kohut did not collect the sample
from the agreed upon compliance point, but the Department still
issued a field order (2010 Order) to Robinson on November 17,
2010, based on Mr. Kohut’s findings.52
The 2010 Order included an itemized account of Robinson’s
failure to comply with the regulations.53 The first paragraph of the
2010 Order detailed Robinson’s violation of the Section 87.102
water discharge limitations.54 The second paragraph explained
Robinson’s failure to adhere to Sections 87.116 and 87.117, which
required the company to submit quarterly water quality reports to
the Department.55 After a meeting and discussion regarding the
proper compliance point, the Department vacated the first para47. See id. at *7 (examining terms to 2002 CO&A).
48. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *8 (establishing compliance
point).
49. See id. (noting statutory effluent limits as “acidity less than alkalinity
and . . . iron concentration less than 7mg/l”); see also 25 PA. CODE § 87.102 (2016)
(stating effluent limits).
50. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *10 (discussing November 2010
sample). The sample showed an iron concentration of 12.4 mg/l, substantially
higher than the statutory effluent limits. Id.
51. See id. at *8 (noting mutually agreed-upon compliance point).
52. See id. at *11 (discussing 2010 Order issued based on sampling results of
non-agreed upon compliance point). The 2010 Order was based on Robinson’s
violation of the effluent limitations in Section 87.102(a) and “failure to submit
quarterly water quality monitoring reports as required by Sections 87.116 and
87.117[.]” Id. See also 25 PA. CODE §§ 87.116, 87.117 (2016) (stating compliance
standards).
53. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *11 (describing 2010 Order).
54. See id. (detailing paragraph one of 2010 Order).
55. See id. (explaining paragraph two of 2010 Order).
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graph because Mr. Kohut failed to use the agreed-upon point.56
Later, the Department withdrew the second paragraph after Robinson offered past-due water quality reports.57
Although the Department vacated the entire 2010 Order,
Robinson was still not in compliance with the statutory discharge
limits for iron at the proper compliance point, the permit boundary.58 Despite the fact that the Department lifted the 2010 Order
and did not impose civil penalties, Robinson appealed the order,
arguing 1) it always met the applicable effluent limitations, and 2) it
always submitted quarterly monitoring results.59
III. BACKGROUND
Acid mine drainage from surface mining is one of the most
dangerous problems facing coal-mining areas because its harmful
effects can last decades after mining operations end.60 Specifically,
surface mining has contaminated more than three thousand miles
of rivers and streams in Pennsylvania.61 Surface mining is more economical than underground mining, however, so coal companies
inevitably view regulating surface mining as a serious threat to
profitability.62
A. Congress Stands Up to King Coal
As of 2014, Washington County contains approximately 1,300
lawfully permitted acres undergoing surface coal mining activities.63
56. See id. at *12 (noting Department’s actions due to prior agreed upon compliance point).
57. See id. (highlighting Robinson’s eventual compliance with Sections
187.116 and 187.117).
58. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *12 (noting continued violation at
Putt Mine). However, the discharge consistently meets the “alkalinity greater than
acidity” requirement. Id.
59. See id. at *1 (summarizing issues on appeal).
60. See Acid Mine Drainage, EARTHWORKS, https://www.earthworksaction.org/
issues/detail/acid_mine_drainage (last visited Sept. 4, 2015) (detailing pollution
associated with acid mine drainage).
61. Coal-Mine-Drainage Projects in Pennsylvania, USGS, http://pa.water.usgs
.gov/projects/energy/amd/ (last updated Oct. 26, 2010, 2:52 PM) (noting pollution impact on Pennsylvania waters). The USGS estimates restoration costs for
damaged watersheds to be up to fifteen billion dollars. Id.
62. See William Hofmann & Steven Horst, Note, The EHB: DEP’s Friend or Foe?
Environmental Hearing Board Review, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 182-86 (2004) (discussing surface mining regulations).
63. See 2014 Bituminous Surface Mines Reporting Production – Listed by County, PA.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVTL. PROTECTION 15, http://files.dep.state.pa.us/Mining/Bur
eauOfMiningPrograms/BMPPortalFiles/Annual_Reports/BituminousAnnualRe
ports/2014/2014BituminousSurfaceMines_ListedbyCounty.pdf (last visited Feb.
18, 2016) (detailing surface mining amounts by county).
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Areas surrounding these coal mines are often exposed to polluted
surface and ground water that adversely affects the health of neighboring communities.64 Ultimately, similar dangers threatening the
environment and community health persuaded Congress to pass
the first version of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA) in 1975.65 Citing economic concerns, President Gerald
Ford vetoed this early version of the SMCRA.66 After additional
hearings regarding the economic and environmental impact of SMCRA in both the House and Senate, the bill passed and President
Jimmy Carter signed it into law in the summer of 1977.67
In the SMCRA’s findings section, Congress described the coal
industry’s economic importance as well as its ability to “adversely
affect commerce and the public welfare[,]” by destroying land value
and polluting water supplies.68 The House Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment also held hearings to discuss dangerous
water pollution caused by surface coal mining.69 Importantly, Congress included a provision recognizing the difficulty in making a
single, overarching law applicable to all states.70 Therefore,
lawmakers delegated primary governmental responsibility for the
bill to the States.71 Congress further established the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (Office) to administer
the program and to assist states in developing regulations conforming to federal minimums and local environmental condi-

64. See Abandoned Mine Site Characterization and Cleanup Handbook, EPA (Aug.
2000), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/
2000_08_pdfs_amscch.pdf (explaining dangers of acid mine drainage to drinking
water).
65. See Robert A. Waters, Note, A Summary of the Legislative History of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the Relevant Legal Periodical Literature,
81 W. VA. L. REV. 775, 776-77 (1979) (detailing legislative history of SMCRA).
66. See id. at 778 (noting President Ford’s veto).
67. See id. at 780-81 (detailing bill history after 1975 veto).
68. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(a)-(d) (2012) (detailing Congressional findings). Additionally, the bill author noted reclamation technology is more advanced and effective at coal mine remediation and reclamation. Id. According to Congress, the
constitutional power used to justify this bill is the commerce clause, and the ability
to regulate interstate commerce. Id.
69. See Reclamation Practices and Environmental Problems of Surface Mining: Hearings on H.R. 2 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, 95th Cong. 91
(1977) (detailing Sierra Club Mining Policy and including environmental impact
data).
70. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2012) (discussing Congressional intent regarding
law).
71. See § 1201(f) (noting applicability to states).
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tions.72 The Office’s principal role, however, was to ensure that
states complied with the federal program.73
Before SMCRA was enacted, states varied in the ways they regulated surface mining.74 Some state officials opposed SMCRA because they believed most states had developed sufficient regulations
during the 1970s.75 Congress, however, did not alter its course.76
Instead, it passed SMCRA partially because of its concerns regarding states’ attempts to protect their lucrative coal industries.77 Today, Congress’s concerns still prove legitimate: the Pennsylvania
coal industry employs approximately 41,577 people and generates
billions of dollars annually.78
B. Pennsylvania’s Plan
Prior to Congress’s enactment of SMCRA, Pennsylvania maintained a well-established and thorough system of surface coal mining regulation.79 Consequently, the federal SMCRA is largely
similar to Pennsylvania’s version of SMCRA.80 When SMCRA was
enacted, Pennsylvania could no longer administer its regulatory
72. See § 1211(a)-(c) (establishing and highlighting duties of office).
73. See § 1211 (detailing duties of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement office). The Secretary of the Interior also has the power to approve or reject
state programs. Id.
74. See K. W. James Rochow, Note, The Far Side of Paradox: State Regulation of the
Environmental Effects of Coal Mining, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 559, 560 (1979) (describing
coal mining regulatory history before SMCRA). The “paradox” in the article’s title
refers to how the SMCRA came about due to the states’ inability to regulate effectively, while at the same time conferring upon the states the duty to enforce the
act. Id. at 559-60.
75. See id. (noting state official’s criticism of Act).
76. See id. (detailing Congressional action).
77. See id. (describing Congressional intent behind passing regulations).
78. See The Economic Impact of the Coal Industry in Pennsylvania, PA. ECON.
LEAGUE OF S.W. PA. (Apr. 2010), http://www.alleghenyconference.org/Pennsylva
niaEconomyLeague/PDFs/EconomicImpactAnalyses/EconomicImpactOfCoalIn
dustryInPa0410.pdf (discussing specific economic consequences and opportunities
through Pennsylvania’s coal industry).
79. 123 CONG. REC. 12, 872 (1977) (including statements recognizing efficiency of Pennsylvania’s reclamation program). In fact, the first director of the
Office was Walter Heine, the former associate deputy secretary in the DEP’s predecessor, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources. See Gerhard Peters & John T. Woodley, Department of the Interior Nomination of Walter N. Heine to be
Director of the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 1 (Oct. 17, 1977), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6805
(providing biographical information on Mr. Heine).
80. See generally John C. Dernbach, Pennsylvania’s Implementation of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act: An Assessment of How “Coop. Federalism” Can Make
State Regulatory Programs More Effective, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 903, 905-08 (1986)
(giving broad overview of differences between Federal SMCRA and Pennsylvania
SMCRA).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016

9

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

260 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII: p. 251
program as before; from 1977 on, Pennsylvania’s surface coal mining regulatory system was preempted by the federal SMCRA and
thus subject to continuous oversight.81
By the 1980s, the Pennsylvania General Assembly established a
body of state laws, compliant with federal minimums, to combat environmental damage resulting from its mining industry.82 By passing these laws, the General Assembly established a system of
enforcement overseen by the Department.83 The purpose of Pennsylvania’s Surface Mining and Reclamation Act was to:
[A]ssure that the coal supply essential to the Nation’s and
the Commonwealth’s energy requirements, and to their
economic and social well-being, is provided and to strike a
balance between protection of the environment and agricultural productivity and the Nation’s and the Commonwealth’s need for coal as an essential source of energy.84
Chapter 87 of the Pennsylvania Code’s Environmental Protection title enables the Department to enforce plans, permits, remining, and performance standards.85 The current regulatory system
in Pennsylvania is considered superior to the prior system because
it blends the strengths of the state and federal regulations.86 After
beginning mining operations, the Department shifts its focus to the
most contentious portion of its regulation: performance standards
for surface mines.87

81. See id. at 960 (noting differences between pre-1977 regulatory scheme and
post-1977 regulatory scheme).
82. See Administrative Code of 1929, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 510-520 (1985) (establishing purpose of statute regulating environmental damage); Clean Streams
Law, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 691.1-702 (1985) (same); Bituminous Mining Subsidence
and Land Conservation Act of 1966, 52 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1406.1-.21 (1985) (same);
Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act, 52 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 1396.1-.31
(1985) (same).
83. See generally Bureau of Mining Programs, PA. DEPARTMENT OF ENVTL. PROTEChttp://www.dep.pa.gov/Business/Land/Mining/BureauofMiningPro
TION,
grams/Pages/default.aspx#.Vqo_fFMrKkZ (last visited Jan. 28, 2016) (discussing
Department’s Bureau of Mining Programs, which oversees Pennsylvania coal companies and has authority to administer Pennsylvania’s coal mining regulations).
84. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1396.1 (1985) (explaining purpose of Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act).
85. See generally 25 PA. CODE 87 (2016) (providing surface coal mining
regulations).
86. See Dernbach, supra note 80, at 965 (describing current system’s superiority to 1977 system).
87. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 87.91-.181 (2016) (listing performance standards and
other regulations).
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C. Performance Standards for Surface Mines
The Department enforces detailed requirements to which all
coal mine operators in Pennsylvania must adhere.88 For example,
the Department strictly enforces statutory standards for acid mine
discharge from surface coal mines.89 In addition to specifying the
maximum allowable levels of iron, manganese, pH, and acidity, the
requirements compel coal companies to install passive treatment
systems in order to comply fully.90 Passive treatment systems are
preferable to active systems due to their relative inexpensiveness,
lack of chemicals, and significant reduction in overall system
maintenance.91
In addition to providing effluent limitations, the regulations
also require surface mine operators to monitor and submit groundwater and surface water quality reports to the Department on a
quarterly basis.92 This requirement allows the Department to easily
monitor acid mine discharge levels, but its success, however, ultimately turns on whether coal companies comply with their
obligations.93
D. The EHB as an Independent, Quasi-Judicial Agency
The General Assembly established the EHB in 1970 as part of
the Department.94 In 1988, however, the EHB became independent of the Department.95 The EHB, “operat[ing] like a court,”
provides a forum to challenge the Department’s actions.96 Additionally, the EHB’s power is primarily limited to reviewing the De88. See §§ 87.91-.181 (listing all performance standards applicable to surface
mine operators).
89. See § 87.102 (stating effluent limitation standards).
90. See § 87.102(e) (detailing post-mining pollution discharge standards). In
addition to reducing the iron, manganese, pH, and acidity, the passive treatment
system also must be able to operate effectively for fifteen to twenty years.
§ 87.102(e)(4)(vi).
91. K.L. Ford, Passive Treatment Systems for Acid Mine Drainage, BUREAU OF LAND
MGMT. 6, (Apr. 2003), http://www.blm.gov/nstc/library/pdf/TN409.pdf (discussing advantages of passive treatment systems).
92. See 25 PA. CODE §§ 87.116-.117 (2016) (stating standards for monitoring
and reporting water discharge).
93. See §§ 87.116-.117 (detailing regulation requirements regarding discharge
levels).
94. See Annual Report 2014, PA. ENVTL. HEARING BOARD, http://ehb.courtapps
.com/content/2014AnnualReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 9, 2015) (detailing history
of EHB).
95. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7514(a) (1988) (delineating EHB’s jurisdiction).
96. History of the Environmental Hearing Board, PA. ENVTL. HEARING BOARD,
http://ehb.courtapps.com/content/ehb_history.php (last visited Sept 9, 2015)
(describing EHB’s similarities to courts).
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partment’s actions.97 The statute defines an “action” as an “order,
decree, decision, determination or ruling by the Department affecting . . . obligations of a person including . . . a permit, license,
approval or certification.”98 Notably, the EHB does not have jurisdiction over orders or rulings that simply affirm a party’s preexisting obligations.99
Moreover, because the EHB is analogous to a court, opinions
must comport with general contract law.100 A consent order and
agreement is a contract, so the EHB must interpret such agreements consistent with the bargained-for exchange the parties reasonably expected.101 Courts generally disfavor rewriting contract
terms, which would alter the parties’ original agreement.102
Moreover, the EHB has consistently rejected appeals of actions
being used by parties to attack another Department action that was
not on appeal.103 In Winegardner v. Commonwealth,104 for example,
the EHB held that its review was limited only to the action appealed.105 The EHB stated it could not employ “an appeal from

97. See Redbank Valley Mun. Auth. v. Commonwealth, No. 2005-262-L, 2006
EHB 813, 819 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Nov. 9, 2006) (discussing EHB’s reviewing
powers).
98. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Commonwealth, 89 A.3d 724, 726 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2014) (defining “action”) (citing 25 PA. CODE § 1021.2(a) (2016)).
99. See id. at 727-28 (holding EHB cannot review Department orders simply
reiterating ongoing obligations).
100. See Robinson Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-186-M, 2015 WL
1501150, at *27 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Mar. 16, 2015) (explaining EHB acts as
court and must adhere to established contract law).
101. See Global Eco-Logical Services, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 2001 EHB 99
(holding contract law principles govern consent orders and agreements), aff’d, 789
A.2d 789 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2001). The basic underlying principle of contract law is
to protect bargained-for expectations of the parties. See Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v.
Bosak, 671 A.2d 277, 282-83 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) (protecting bargained-for exchange of parties).
102. See generally Commonwealth v. U.S. Steel Corp., 325 A.2d 324 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1974) (holding court should not modify contract absent fraud, accident, or mistake).
103. See, e.g., Greif Packaging, L.L.C. v. Commonwealth, 2012 EHB 85, 88 (Pa.
Envtl. Hearing Bd. Apr. 12, 2012) (holding parties may not raise issues related to
other orders); Love v. Commonwealth, 2010 EHB 523, 525 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd.
July 12, 2010) (holding same as Greif Packaging); Northampton Twp. v. Commonwealth, 2008 EHB 563, 568 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Oct. 14, 2008) (holding same
as Greif Packaging); Grimaud v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 638 A.2d 299, 303 n.7 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1994) (holding same as Greif Packaging) (citing Fuller v. Dep’t of
Envtl. Res., 599 A.2d 248 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)).
104. No. 2002-003-L, 2002 WL 31115001 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Sept. 17,
2002).
105. Id. at *2-4 (finding EHB’s role limited to order on appeal).
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one Departmental action as a vehicle for reviewing the propriety of
prior Departmental actions.”106
Importantly, when the Department acts with discretionary regulatory authority, the EHB must determine whether the Department abused its discretion.107 In Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v.
Department of Environmental. Protection,108 the court held “[if] the record demonstrate[s] the Department abused its discretion, the
EHB [can] substitute its discretion for that of the Department.”109
In Browning-Ferris, a landfill company appealed an EHB order to the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.110 The at-issue EHB ruling
rescinded a prior Department order that previously allowed the
company to increase the volume of its landfill.111 The Commonwealth Court reversed the EHB’s order, holding the Department
properly conducted business within its delegated discretion.112
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Robinson Coal, the EHB addressed Robinson’s appeal of the
Department’s 2010 Order concerning enforcement of the 2002
CO&A.113 The 2010 Order enforced two duties regarding Robinson’s obligations from the 2002 CO&A to provide treatment for
post-mining discharge at Putt Mine.114 Although Robinson resolved those obligations, the EHB sought to determine whether
treatment was still necessary at the site as part of its decision.115

106. Id. (providing EHB’s limitation on reviewing prior actions).
107. See Warren Sand & Gravel Co., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 341 A.2d 556,
565 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (holding when Department acts with discretionary
authority, EHB determines whether they abused their discretion).
108. 819 A.2d 148 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
109. See id. at 153 (discussing standard on review of EHB order).
110. See id. at 150 (noting procedural posture).
111. Id. at 150-51 (discussing facts). Additionally, the EHB sustained the
homeowners’ appeal of the Department’s action. Id.
112. Id. at 154 (reversing EHB order to hold for Department).
113. See Robinson Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-186-M, 2015 WL
1501150, at *1-2 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Mar. 16, 2015) (discussing appeal of Department’s 2010 order).
114. Id. at *12 (noting 2010 Order obligations).
115. Id. (stating overall issue on appeal). For a further discussion of Robinson’s obligations under the 2002 CO&A, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text.
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A. Was Treatment Still Necessary?
The central question the parties disputed was whether treatment of the acid mine discharge was still necessary.116 The court
quickly dispensed of this issue, stating the answer to Robinson’s
claim was “fairly easy to [answer].”117 The issue’s significance, however, is evident: if treatment was no longer necessary, Robinson
would not be obligated to perform its duties listed in the 2002
CO&A.118 If that was the case, Robinson would be discharged from
its treatment duties and would have the treatment trust fund monies returned.119 Therefore, it was vital for the EHB to determine if
treatment was still required.120
In answering this “fairly easy” question, the EHB initially noted
the parties agreed “the discharge from the [correct compliance
point did] not meet the current regulatory discharge limits for iron
[content].”121 The EHB decided that while the ALD portion of the
treatment system may or may not still be necessary, the settling basin was still required to reduce the discharge’s iron content.122
While the EHB acknowledged the water discharge quality’s
gradual improvement over time, it elected not to wait for the discharge to meet the statutory effluent limitations before making its
ruling.123 Because the discharge failed to satisfy the statutory limitations, the EHB decided Robinson had not established that treatment was no longer necessary.124 The EHB further decided it
would “address [the] issue that the Parties neglected to resolve
when they negotiated the [2002 CO&A].”125
B. When Will Treatment Be No Longer Necessary?
As the EHB stated in its opinion to Robinson’s 2011 Motion for
Summary Judgment, “the [true] problem in [the dispute was] the
parties’ [inability,] in [the 2002 CO&A] . . . [to] establish[ ] [ ]
116. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *16 (noting parties’ positions on
issue).
117. Id. (footnote omitted) (stating answer to Robinson’s question was
simple).
118. Id. (discussing Robinson’s position).
119. See id. at *16-17 (discussing financial assurance in 2002 CO&A).
120. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *16 (noting parties’ disagreement
regarding Robinson’s continuing treatment obligations).
121. Id. at *16-17 (noting ALD outlet discharge’s iron content).
122. Id. at *17 (finding settling basin still necessary to reduce iron levels).
123. See id. (stating reasoning for decision).
124. Id. at *18 (holding that treatment is still required).
125. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *17-18 (addressing when treatment
will no longer be necessary).
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procedures for Robinson to [prove] that treatment . . . [was] no
longer necessary.”126 The EHB quickly dispelled Robinson’s claim
that it was not required to treat the discharge because the system
was working as designed.127 The EHB reasoned that, even if true,
Robinson’s argument ignored the fact that the discharge did not
meet the statutory effluent limitations.128 Furthermore, the court
continually highlighted “all of the Department’s efforts to avoid responding to Robinson’s repeated assertion that treatment is no
longer necessary.”129
The EHB qualified the Department’s position that treatment
will forever be necessary by instead holding it will not be necessary
once discharge consistently meets the Section 87.102 limitations.130
In making this decision, the EHB moved the compliance point
from the permit boundary to the ALD outlet, which eliminated the
settling basin benefits from compliance testing.131
The EHB provided three reasons to support its finding.132
First, the EHB recognized the difficulty of measuring effluent levels
at the ALD outlet, but determined that without the new compliance
point, there would be no way to eventually release Robinson from
its obligations.133 Therefore, the EHB sought to move the compliance point to prevent Robinson from perpetual treatment.134 Second, the EHB noted Robinson had expended time, money, and
effort reclaiming the site for several years, which ultimately improved discharge quality.135 Due to the Department’s failure to recognize Robinson’s efforts, the EHB allowed Robinson to use the

126. Id. at *18 (quoting Robinson Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-186M, 2011 WL 6934393, at *9 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Dec. 23, 2011)) (stating underlying problems with appeal).
127. Id. (noting Robinson’s position).
128. Id. at *17-18 (detailing iron levels in discharge).
129. Id. at *16 (highlighting Department’s efforts to avoid responding to
Robinson).
130. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *18 (footnote omitted) (deciding
when treatment will not be necessary).
131. See id. at *8 (noting original compliance point as permit boundary). The
permit boundary is not the same point as the ALD outlet. Id. The ALD outlet was
simply a different sampling point originally used to evaluate whether ALD discharge met the statutory effluent limit for acidity less than alkalinity. Id.
132. Id. at *18-19 (establishing three reasons to support its findings).
133. Id. at *18 (discussing new compliance point). If there were no place to
measure compliance, Robinson would have to treat the discharge in perpetuity.
Id.
134. Id. (discussing reasoning for new compliance point).
135. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *19 (detailing Robinson’s reclamation activities).
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ALD outlet as the compliance point.136 Third, the EHB rejected
the Department’s position in the 2002 CO&A that Robinson was to
treat the discharge forever without an opportunity to prove treatment was unnecessary.137 Due to the Department’s failure to afford
Robinson an opportunity to prove treatment was no longer necessary, the EHB found that the Department abused its discretion and
thus, the EHB “substitute[d] its discretion for that of the
Department.”138
With this ruling, the EHB decided to step in and provide the
parties with an answer due to, in part, the Department’s refusal to
discuss the question with Robinson.139 Moreover, the EHB emphasized the difficulty of getting an answer from the Department regarding how Robinson could terminate its obligations under the
2002 CO&A.140 To this end, the EHB continually identified the underlying problem was simply “the parties failure in 2002 to include
language in their 2002 CO&A that establishes agreed to procedures
for Robinson to demonstrate that treatment . . . requirements are
no longer necessary.”141
C. The Vigorous Dissent
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Labuskes issued the lone retort.142 Judge Labuskes briefly described the appeal’s procedure and stated that the matter could have concluded
once the Department vacated the first and second paragraphs of
the 2010 Order.143 Judge Labuskes’ dissent examined the rules
constraining the EHB’s power, and articulated specific reasons why
the EHB lacked authority to rule on the 2002 CO&A.144 The dis136. Id. (noting reasoning for establishing new compliance point).
137. Id. (discussing Department’s extreme position).
138. See id. at *10 n.7 (establishing Department’s abuse of discretion); See also
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 819 A.2d 148, 153 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (describing EHB’s standard of review). “[T]he EHB [can] substitute its discretion for that of the Department.” Id.
139. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *18-19 (noting reason for decision).
140. Id. at *2 (detailing Department’s lack of responsiveness).
141. Id. (identifying parties initial problem in appeal).
142. Id. at *23 (Labuskes, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part) (introducing dissent).
143. Id. (describing appeal).
144. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *23 (disagreeing with majority’s analytical framework). The dissent noted that the EHB never had jurisdiction over
the 2010 Order because that order merely “embodied a finding that Robinson’s
preexisting obligations are continuing, [which] is not an appealable action.” Id. at
*24. The EHB has no power to review Department orders that reiterate ongoing
party obligations. See Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 89
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sent argued the only order on appeal was the 2010 Order, while the
majority essentially traveled “back in time” to find the Department
abused its discretion in the 2002 CO&A.145 Judge Labuskes described the majority’s action as a “slippery slope” because Robinson
never attacked the validity of the 2002 CO&A in this appeal.146
The dissent also took issue with how the majority, “acting essentially as a court in equity,” inserted and altered terms in the 2002
CO&A.147 The dissent specifically argued the EHB “ignored [ ]
well-established principles” when it disregarded the “bargained-for
expectations of [Robinson and the Department].”148 Judge
Labuskes expressed his frustration with the majority’s emphatic
“dissatis[faction] with the Department’s [ ] lack of responsiveness
regarding Robinson’s [legal obligations].”149 Judge Labuskes concluded his opinion by framing the majority’s justification as an “illusory situation where[ ] Robinson [was] a frustrated suitor
desperately seeking an answer from a reluctant flame,” and the
EHB “step[ped] in as Aphrodite . . . to help Melanion prevail over
Atlanta.”150
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The EHB determined that the Department abused its discretion when it failed to provide a method for Robinson to prove treatment was no longer necessary.151 The court’s overemphasis on the
Department’s unresponsiveness to Robinson’s inquiries clouded its
judgment and inspired the EHB to improperly act as a court in eqA.3d 724, 726 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (concluding EHB lacked jurisdiction over
appeal).
145. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *26 (Labuskes, J., concurring in part,
and dissenting in part) (detailing flaws in majority opinion).
146. Id. (rejecting majority’s analytical framework).
147. See id. at *23-24, *27-28 (noting that decision disregarded contract law).
148. Id. at *28-29 (rejecting majority’s changes to 2002 CO&A and interpretation of contract law).
149. Id. at *30 (discussing majority’s justification for actions).
150. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *30 (Labuskes, J., concurring in part,
and dissenting in part) (concluding opinion). Judge Labuskes refers to a Greek
myth, in which Melanion, who, after falling in love with Atlanta, prayed to the
goddess of love, Aphrodite, for assistance. See Atlanta, GREEKMYTHOLOGY.COM,
http://www.greekmythology.com/Myths/Heroes/Atlanta/atlanta.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2015) (describing Atlanta’s character and significance in Greek mythology). Aphrodite gave Melanion golden apples, which he used to win a race
and Atlanta’s heart. Id.
151. For a discussion on how the majority reasoned that the Department
abused its discretion, see supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016

17

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

268 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII: p. 251
uity.152 Furthermore, the EHB ignored some of contract law’s wellestablished principles.153 The EHB’s final solution does not resolve
the issue; rather, it unintentionally condemned Robinson to eternal
treatment of the Putt Mine discharge when it moved the agreedupon compliance point.154
A. The EHB Acted Beyond its Power
The EHB overlooked precedent by permitting this appeal because the 2010 Order did not constitute a “Department action” for
purposes of EHB jurisdiction.155 The 2010 Order did not affect
Robinson’s “personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or obligations,” but rather, it merely alleged violation
of Robinson’s “already existing obligations and, thus, d[id] not constitute an ‘action.’”156 The 2010 Order merely informed Robinson
of statutory violations, it did not actually order Robinson to do anything besides comply with the 2002 CO&A.157
The EHB violated one of its own fundamental rules when it
found an abuse of discretion in the 2002 CO&A, despite the fact
that it was not the “Department action” before the court.158 This
rule, legislatively prescribed in the EHB’s governing statute and judicially confirmed in Winegardner, limits the EHB’s power only to
the action on appeal.159 In this respect, the EHB ignored its juris152. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *2 (noting difficulties with Department). Specifically, the EHB stated that “Robinson is no further along with
the Sisyphean task of getting an answer from the Department.” Id.
153. For a further discussion of how the EHB ignored contract law, see infra
notes 166-173 and accompanying text.
154. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *21 (changing compliance point
from permit boundary to ALD outlet). This modification does not allow acidic
water to flow through the settling basin, which is the primary way to reduce iron
content. Id. at *6.
155. See Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 89 A.3d 724,
726 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (defining “action”); see also Redbank Valley Mun.
Auth. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 2005-262-L, 2006 EHB 813, 819 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Nov. 9, 2006) (reviewing EHB’s jurisdictional authority).
156. See Chesapeake Appalachia, 89 A.3d at 726-27 (reviewing statutory limitations, and subsequently finding orders affirming preexisting obligations are not
appealable). An order simply restating a parties’ existing obligation “is not a decision from which an appeal may be taken.” Id. at 727.
157. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *11-12 (vacating paragraph one
after meeting and paragraph two after Robinson submitted water quality reports).
158. See Winegardner v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-003-L, 2002 EHB 790, 793
(Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Sept. 17, 2002) (holding parties cannot use appeal to attack prior Departmental action).
159. See id. (confirming EHB limitations); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7514(a)
(1988) (delineating EHB’s jurisdiction); see also Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150,
at *25 (Labuskes, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part) (noting majority’s
unprecedented action).
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dictional statute and years of precedent when it found an abuse of
discretion in the 2002 CO&A because Robinson never appealed
that order.160 Consequently, the EHB found an abuse of discretion
relating to the Department’s “decision to seek to impose . . . perpetual responsibility on Robinson without” allowing them to “demonstrate that treatment [was] no longer necessary.”161 The 2010
Order contained no mention of imposing perpetual responsibility
on Robinson.162 The Department’s action on appeal was, undoubtedly, the 2010 Order merely outlining Robinson’s statutory violations, and not the 2002 CO&A, on which the EHB erroneously
focused its attention.163
Rather than providing statutory or precedential rationale in
support of its authority to review the 2002 CO&A, the EHB pointed
primarily to the Department’s lack of responsiveness to Robinson’s
requests for discussions.164 Based on this apparent validation, the
EHB decided it would alter the terms of a thirteen-year-old, privately negotiated agreement between two sophisticated parties without any basis.165
B. The EHB Failed to Adhere to Basic Contract Law
As argued by the Judge Labuskes in his dissent, the EHB violated fundamental principles of contract law by rewriting the terms
of the 2002 CO&A to alter the compliance point.166 The Department and Robinson negotiated the 2002 CO&A, in which the Department released $200,969 of treatment bonds to Robinson, and
Robinson funded a $25,893 treatment trust fund.167 The fifth para160. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *19 (finding Department abused
its discretion in 2002 CO&A).
161. Id. (providing reasoning for Department’s abuse of discretion).
162. Id. at *11 (presenting 2010 Order terms).
163. Id. at *1 (noting date of appeal). “Robinson filed an appeal with the
Board of the Department’s November 17, 2010 compliance order in which it challenged the Department’s action.” Id.
164. Id. at *17-20 (describing decision to establish new compliance point).
The court based its decision on the Department’s failure to respond to Robinson.
Id.
165. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *20 (altering 2002 CO&A between Department and Robinson); see also id. at *27 (Labuskes, J., concurring in
part, and dissenting in part) (arguing majority disregarded contract law).
166. See id. at *27-28 (Labuskes, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part)
(expressing concern with majority for altering terms of 2002 CO&A); see also
Global Eco-Logical Servs., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 789 A.2d 789, 796 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2001) (finding that courts “should only modify [a consent order and agreement’s] terms, which were negotiated by the parties, with great reluctance.”).
167. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *7 (detailing 2002 CO&A
financials).
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graph of the agreement included “Robinson’s obligation to ‘treat
the Putt Mine discharge, and to operate and maintain the treatment system, in perpetuity, or until water treatment is no longer
necessary.’”168 This clause was bargained for by competent parties,
with the assistance of counsel, and, pursuant to contract law, the
EHB should have protected the parties’ reasonable expectations.169
For these reasons, the EHB should have, at least, been
unenthusiastic or reluctant to modify the terms of the agreement.170 Instead, the EHB transformed the 2002 CO&A into an
arrangement which was never agreed to by the parties.171 The parties also never explicitly asked the EHB to revise that earlier document in their appeal, as Robinson’s appeal was based solely on the
Department’s 2010 Order.172 Furthermore, as the dissent noted,
the EHB could have compelled the Department and Robinson to
meet and discuss a more practical arrangement.173
C. Unintentional Perpetual Treatment
When the EHB unilaterally changed the compliance point
from the permit boundary to the ALD outlet, Robinson was improperly burdened and it is unlikely that the discharge will ever
meet the statutory limitations.174 This problem was briefly mentioned, but overlooked, in both the majority and dissenting opinions.175 By moving the compliance point to the ALD outlet, the
discharge will not receive the benefit of the settling basin, which is
designed to reduce the discharge’s iron levels.176 Due to this over168. Id. at *6 (detailing specifics of 2002 CO&A).
169. See Hazleton Area Sch. Dist. v. Bosak, 671 A.2d 277, 282-83 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1996) (protecting bargained-for exchange of parties).
170. See Commonwealth v. U.S. Steel Corp., 325 A.2d 324, 328 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1974) (holding court should not modify mutual agreement of parties).
171. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *18-19 (deciding on ALD outlet
as new compliance point under 2002 CO&A).
172. Id. at *1 (stating appeal’s origins). This appeal stemmed from “the Department’s November 17, 2010 compliance order in which it challenged the Department’s action.” Id.
173. Id. at *27 (noting EHB could have required parties to renegotiate). For
a discussion of why the EHB’s decision forces Robinson to treat the discharge forever, see infra notes 174-181 and accompanying text.
174. See Reference Guide to Treatment Technologies, supra note 42, at 13 (describing importance and usefulness of settling basin in passive treatment system).
175. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *18 (noting necessity of settling
basin and ditch); see also id. at *29 (Labuskes, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (stating new compliance point “deprives Robinson of [ ] benefits . . . provided by [ ] pond and [ ] ditch.”).
176. See id. at *18 (majority opinion) (detailing settling basins in passive treatment systems).
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sight, iron levels are unlikely to be reduced by any meaningful
amount prior to compliance testing, and will likely consistently violate Section 87.102.177 As a result, the EHB has forced Robinson to
indefinitely treat the discharge because the ALD outlet discharge
will not have iron removed via the settling basin prior to
sampling.178
Although the EHB recognized the importance of the settling
basin and noted the difficulty in using a point further along in the
system, it still decided to use the ALD outlet because there was no
other location to measure compliance.179 The EHB, however,
could have ordered the Department and Robinson to discuss a
more practical solution that would align with their respective interests moving forward.180 Additionally, Robinson had not incurred
any expenses in the last seventeen years in treating the discharge;
perhaps simply waiting and not altering the parties’ agreement
would have been a better course of action for the EHB.181
VI. IMPACT
The EHB’s decision did not immediately affect Robinson because the 2010 Order was withdrawn and it was clear that the Putt
Mine discharge still violated statutory limitations.182 This ruling’s
influence, however, will extend into the future because Robinson
will likely be forced to treat the discharge indefinitely.183 The
EHB’s decision also considerably increased its power, and the EHB
will almost certainly use this case as precedent to impermissibly review otherwise unappealable actions and alter terms of agreements
not on appeal.184 The EHB’s willingness to find the Department
abused its discretion eight years prior to the 2010 Order is alarm177. See id. at *12 (finding iron levels consistently exceed applicable effluent
limitations).
178. Id. at *18 (describing new compliance point and location).
179. See id. (noting continuing importance of settling basin and ditch).
180. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *27 (Labuskes, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting EHB could have allowed parties to take whatever
other actions they deemed appropriate).
181. Id. at *30 (discussing last seventeen years of Robinson’s expenses for
treatment).
182. For a discussion of the facts surrounding the 2010 Order, see supra notes
49-59 and accompanying text.
183. See Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *18 (discussing Department’s extreme position).
184. For a discussion of how the EHB acted in excess of its delegated power,
see supra notes 142-150 and accompanying text.
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ing, because the EHB does not have had the power to do so.185
Additionally, the EHB’s disregard for its statutory and precedential
requirements provides little guidance or consistency to the various
coal companies in determining whether to appeal Department
actions.186
The EHB could have laid out Robinson’s statutory violations,
noted the 2002 CO&A’s inadequacy, and required the parties to
revise their agreement and meet regularly in the future.187 Such a
framework would have proceeded within the EHB’s mandated
power and would have likely been amenable to the parties.188 If the
case proceeded this way, the Department and Robinson could have
negotiated treatment deadlines reflecting their respective environmental and economic concerns.189 Unfortunately, the EHB decided to take such an unauthorized and unprecedented action.190
The Robinson Coal case may demonstrate the furthest extent a
quasi-judicial, regulatory appeals hearing board will go towards
achieving what it believes to be an equitable result.191 The EHB’s
decision will force both the Department and various coal companies to reevaluate the terms of their respective ongoing agreements.192 Furthermore, the decision will require parties to
consider whether those agreements adequately provide methods to
determine regulatory compliance and discharge statutory obligations.193 Given these considerations, it is apparent the Robinson

185. For a more in-depth discussion of how the EHB determined the Department abused its discretion, see supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
186. For a discussion of EHB statutory requirements, see supra notes 94-102
and accompanying text. For a discussion of EHB precedential guidelines, see
supra notes 103-112 and accompanying text.
187. Robinson Coal, 2015 WL 1501150, at *23 (Labuskes, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting how appeal could have been resolved more easily).
188. For a more in-depth discussion of the EHB’s legislatively and judicially
allotted power, see supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
189. For a critical analysis of what steps the EHB should have taken, see supra
notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
190. For a discussion of what the EHB changed in the 2002 CO&A as well as
its further actions, see supra notes 125-140 and accompanying text.
191. For a discussion of how the EHB went too far in its decision, see supra
notes 142-150 and accompanying text.
192. For a critical explanation of how the EHB altered privately negotiated
terms in the 2002 CO&A, see supra notes 166-173 and accompanying text.
193. For a discussion of the EHB’s decision regarding when treatment would
no longer be necessary, see supra notes 126-131 and accompanying text.
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Coal decision will significantly impact the way coal companies interact and draft agreements with the Department in the future.194
Ryan P. Duffy*
194. For a discussion of why the EHB’s decision will impact Pennsylvania’s
coal companies, see supra notes 182-190 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2014, Franklin & Marshall College.
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